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Abstract
We present the first quantum anonymous notification (QAN) protocol that introduces anonymity and paves
the way for anonymous secure quantum communication in quantum networks. QAN protocol has applica-
tions ranging from multiparty quantum computation to quantum internet. We utilize the QAN protocol to
propose an anonymous quantum private comparison protocol in an n-node quantum network. This protocol
can compare private information of any 2 ≤ k ≤ n parties with the help of the remaining n− k parties and
a semi-honest third party. These protocols feature a traceless property, i.e., encoding operations cannot be
traced back to their originating sources. Security analysis shows that this protocol is robust against external
adversaries and malicious participants.
Keywords: Quantum anonymity, quantum anonymous notification, quantum network, quantum private
comparison, quantum information
1. Introduction
Development of quantum communication systems provides potential benefits to carry out the information
processing tasks in a quantum network. Many quantum network based applications such as quantum secret
sharing [1, 2], quantum voting [3], and quantum conference key agreement [4] have been proposed with the
vision of quantum internet [5].
One practical application of quantum networks is quantum private comparison (QPC) protocols [6]. The
main objective of QPC is to allow two parties to compare their private information with the help of a semi-
honest third party (TP) (which can be almost dishonest [7]), without leaking the information to participants
and the TP. QPC has been generalized to compare secrets of multiple parties and is called multiparty QPC
(MQPC) [8]. MQPC has many applications such as quantum voting [9], quantum bidding [10], and quantum
auctions [11].
One of the challenging requirements of quantum networks is to provide anonymity of the sender and the
receiver when they wish to communicate through the network. Anonymity should be guaranteed without
making any assumption on the computational power of malicious participants who might have quantum
computers. The introduction of anonymity provides security against maliciously behaved participants and
potential adversaries.
In the classical scenario, Broadbent et. al. showed how to transmit a message anonymously with
information-theoretic security in the absence of an honest majority [12]. The key enabler for the anonymity
in their proposal is an anonymous notification protocol, which utilizes authenticated pairwise private channels
and simultaneous classical broadcast channels.
In the case of quantum communication, the first work related to an anonymous message was proposed by
Christandl and Wehner [13]. They proposed the protocols with perfect anonymity for quantum broadcast
and the creation of an EPR pair between two remote parties. More recently, the protocol for anonymity in
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Figure 1: Anonymous quantum notification protocol.
a practical quantum network was proposed [14]. The main ingredient of the protocol which introduces the
anonymity in the network is a classical notification protocol. However, this classical notification protocol
can be vulnerable to quantum computers. That means communicating parties are no longer anonymous
against a sufficiently powerful quantum adversary.
We present the first quantum anonymous notification (QAN) protocol to introduce anonymity in a
practical quantum network. This protocol guarantees the anonymity of communicating parties and also
features traceless property, i.e., once the receiver is notified there is no way to trace the notifier. We exemplify
the application of QAN on a new MQPC, where the QAN acts as the main ingredient for providing the
anonymity. Our MQPC protocol compares private information anonymously of any 2 ≤ k ≤ n parties with
the help of the remaining n − k parties and the semi-honest TP. In contrast to previous MQPC protocols,
our proposed protocol removes the requirement of use of hash function, quantum key distribution, quantum
secure direct communication, or multiple TPs [15, 7, 16, 17]. We prove the security against common attacks
launched by the participants, TP, and outsiders.
2. Quantum Anonymous Notification
Here we provide the QAN protocol for a quantum network where any of the participants can anonymously
notify another participant for any upcoming targeted communication task.
Communication scenario.—Our network consists of n agents that can perform local operations and
classical communication (LOCC). GHZ states are shared between these n agents using the protocol in [18, 19].
We also require pairwise classical authenticated channels between agents. The communication objective is
to allow any honest party to anonymously notify any other party in the network. The adversaries and
malicious agents aim is to break the anonymity or security of the protocol.
Protocol 1 Quantum Anonymous Notification
Prerequisite: n (n)-partite GHZ states.
Protocol Parameters
• Sender choice of the receiver is party r
• UI =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, UZ =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
The Protocol
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1. GHZ states and the constituent particles of all GHZ states are numbered such that qij is the ith particle
in the jth GHZ state. Each party i is given n particles, qij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
2. Each party i applies U ij on the q
i
j according to the rule:
U ij =
{
UZ , with probability PZ ,
UI , with probability 1− PZ ,
(1)
if j = r is the intended party to be notified. Otherwise U ij = UI with probability 1.
3. Each party applies H to all of the held particles and measures them in the computational basis. The
measurement results on qij is m
i
j ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Each party i announces the measurement results mij ∀j 6= i on a classical authenticated channel.
5. Each party calculates mj = ⊕ni=1mij for their allotted GHZ state.
6. Steps 1–5 are repeated K times. Party j is notified if mj = 1 for any run of the protocol.
Here we analyze the Protocol 1. We assume that (n)-partite GHZ states are shared between the network,
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉⊗n + |1〉⊗n
)
.
In step 1), each party is allotted with a GHZ state. 2) The sender simply notifies by applying UZ on the
receiver related particle of GHZ state with a probability of PZ . This introduces the phase on the receiver
GHZ state with a probability PZ . 3) After the H gate state changes into the superposition of all strings
Ej ∈ {0, 1}n with an odd number of 1’s if j = r else even number of 1’s:
H⊗n |GHZ〉
=
1√
2n+1
∑
Ej∈{0,1}n
(
1 + (−1)v⊕|Ej |
)
|Ej〉 ,
where |Ej | is the hamming weight of string Ej . After step 4 & 5, each party calculates mi for their allotted
GHZ state. If the party is notified then she will get odd number of 1’s and v = 1 else she is not notified
and v = 0. This result mj is only available to the party i. Our protocol gives the perfect anonymity to the
receiver and the sender. Malicious participants cannot obtain the identity of the notifier and the notified
party even if they collaborate as long as the total number of collaborating parties is less than n− 2.
Fig. 1 shows the QAN protocol for n = 4 on qi4 where any of the parties can notify the fourth party
A− 4.
3. Anonymous Multiparty Quantum Private Comparison
In this section, we provide an application for quantum anonymity in multiparty computation protocol.
We consider the problem of multiparty quantum private comparison. First, we provide the protocol for
resource sharing, which will be used as a sub-protocol for the anonymous MQPC protocol. In this protocol,
agents are connected via the quantum channel and classical authenticated channel.
Protocol 2 Resource sharing and security check
Protocol Parameters
• n: Total number of participants
• L: Total number of (n)-partite GHZ states shared at the end of the protocol
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Figure 2: Modified anonymous quantum notification protocol.
• S: Security parameter, the number of GHZ states utilized in the security check and verification.
The Protocol
1. State Preparation: All parties in the network are indexed with i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. A randomly
designated player (e.g., Alice, with index a) prepares K = L + S GHZ states and labels them as
F ij , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}. Here F ij is the ith particle in the jthe GHZ state.
2. State Distribution: Alice sends F ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ K particles to ith party in the network through
quantum channel and keeps F aj for herself.
3. Security Check & Verification: Participants repeat the following steps S number of times:
(i) One of the party i′ 6= a randomly announces j′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, and h = 0, 1. Each party i
applies Hh on F ij′ where H is the Hadamard gate.
(ii) Alice measures F aj′ in the computational basis and announces the outcome on the classical au-
thenticated channel. After Alice’s announcement, the rest of the parties perform the same mea-
surement on their respective particles and announce their measurement results.
(iii) The protocol aborts if 1) any party refuses to announce the measurement results, or 2) the
measurement results are not consistent with the GHZ state.
4. If the protocol does not abort, they have shared L (n)-partite GHZ states with probability 1− 2−S .
After the resource sharing protocol, we move towards the first step of anonymous quantum private com-
parison. We use Protocol 1 to introduce the quantum anonymity in quantum private comparison network.
In the quantum private comparison network, TP performs the comparison between competing parties and
is already known as the notifier. Therefore, only the receiver’s anonymity is required. Protocol 1 can be
easily modified to provide receiver anonymity.
In Protocol 1, small changes are made in steps 1-4. 1) (n + 1)-partite GHZ states are shared instead
of (n)-partite where the (n + 1)th particle is held by the TP. 2) The TP only applies UTPj on the q
TP
j
particle to notify the competing parties. 3) The TP also performs this step similarly on her held particle.
4) Each party announces the measurement result mij ∀j 6= i to TP via a classical authenticated channel. TP
calculates miR = ⊕ni=1mij ⊕mTPj , ∀i 6= j for each party and sends it to the respective parties on a classical
authenticated channel. After this procedure, if a party obtains mj = 1 for any run of the protocol then she
is a competing party. Else she will assist the TP for the comparison. The simplified setup of this protocol is
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Figure 3: Example run of anonymous quantum private comparison protocol for two comparing parties in a four-node network.
explained in Fig. 2 for the four-party case. All parties and the TP already shared a five-partite GHZ state.
The notification procedure is shown only for the A-4 party and similarly follows for other parties as well.
The comparison protocol starts after the successful run of the notification procedure. We first present
the protocol for the two-party comparison in a network of n parties.
Protocol 3 Anonymous Quantum Private Comparison (For two parties in an n-partite network)
Prerequisite: From Protocol 2. M (n + 1)-partite and M (n)-partite GHZ states whose particles are
labelled as Gij and F
i
j , respectively. G
n+1
j , 1 ≤ j ≤M are held by the TP.
Protocol Parameters
• M : Total number of secret bits of each party
• n: Total number of parties in the network
The Protocol
1. Each notified party (e.g., Alice and Bob, labelled with indexes a and b, respectively) encode their
secrets as follows.
For 1 ≤ j ≤M :
(i) Alice and Bob measure F aj and F
b
j , respectively, in the computational basis. Let k
a
j and k
b
j be
their measurement outcomes.
(ii) If kaj = k
b
j = 0, Alice and Bob encode their secret messages by applying UI(UZ) for the message
bit 0(1) on Gaj and G
b
j , respectively. Else if k
a
j = k
b
j = 1, they reverse the role of UI and UZ .
2. After the encoding, each participant including Alice, Bob, and TP apply H to their Gij , qubits.
3. Each participant and TP measure their Gij qubits in the computational basis and send their measure-
ment outcomes mij to the TP via the classical authenticated channel.
4. The TP calculates the mj = ⊕n+1i=1 mij for each secret bit j. The secrets of Alice and Bob are equal if
mj = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ M , otherwise they are not equal. The TP announces whether or not the secrets are
equal.
This protocol is also based on the LOCC only. For example, the notified competing participants are
Alice and Bob have a secret bit b1 and b2, respectively, where b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}.
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Figure 4: A-i Device (DA-i) where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. M ij represents jth secret bit of ith party and M is the total number of secret
bit.
In step 1, Alice and Bob apply the unitaries UI or UZ on the particles of (n+ 1)-partite GHZ state for
the message bit b1 and b2. This encoding depends upon the measurement outcome of their (n)-partite GHZ
state particle. After the encoding, the change of phase in global GHZ state depends upon the secret bits,
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉⊗n+1 + (−1)b1⊕b2 |1〉⊗n+1
)
.
If the secret bits b1 6= b2, then the phase of the global GHZ state changes else it remains the same. Each
participant and the TP applies the H gate to their particles in step 2. This changes the GHZ state into the
superposition of all strings Ej ∈ {0, 1} with an even number of 1’s for b1 = b2 or an odd number of 1’s for
b1 6= b2. After H, state becomes:
H⊗n+1 |GHZ〉
=
1√
2n+2
∑
Ej∈{0,1}n+1
(
1 + (−1)b1⊕b2⊕|Ej |
)
|Ej〉 ,
where |Ej | is the hamming weight of string Ej . TP computes the phase of the GHZ state after step 3. If
the result is mj = 0 for each secret bit j then secret is equal else secrets are not equal. In the Fig. 3 & 4
simplified example of the experimental setup for a four-partite case is shown. Fig. 4 explains the inside of
the device of participants. Fig. 3 explains that A-2 and A-4 laboratories are comparing secrets anonymously
with the help of the remaining parties and the TP.
In the following, we present the protocol of private comparison between more than two parties. This
protocol is similar to the Protocol 3 with a slight modification. In this protocol, both the unitaries are
utilized for a single secret bit.
Protocol 4 Anonymous Quantum Private Comparison (For n > 2)
Prerequisite:
• K (n+1)-partite GHZ states, where K = (2dlog(n)e+ 2)M . The particle held by the ith party, which
will be utilized for comparing the mth bit of the message is labelled as Qm,ik,g . The role of k ∈ {0, 1},
and g ∈ {0, 1, · · · dlog(n)e} will be explained in the protocol. Qm,n+1k,g ,∀(m, k, g) are held by the TP.
• M n-partite GHZ states. The particle held of the jth state held by the ith party is labeled as F ij .
Protocol Parameters
• M : Total number of secret bits of each party
• n: Total number of parties in the network
• Ug(φ) = cos(φ/2)UI + i sin(φ/2)UZ , where φ = pi/2g and 0 ≤ g ≤ dlog(n)e.
The Protocol
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1. Each notified party (e.g. Alice, Bob, and Charlie, labelled with indexes a, b, and c, respectively)
encode their secrets as follows.
Steps (i)–(ii) are repeated for 1 ≤ m ≤M :
(i) Alice, Bob, and Charlie measure F am, F
b
m and F
c
m, respectively, in the computational basis. Let
kam = k
b
m = k
c
m = k be their measurement outcomes.
Step (ii) is repeated for 0 ≤ g ≤ log(n):
(ii) Alice, Bob, and Charlie encode their secret bits by applying UI(Ug) for the message bit 0(1) on
Qm,ak,g , Q
m,b
k,g and Q
m,c
k,g , respectively. Then, they reverse the role of UI and Ug and perform the
encoding on Qm,a¬k,g, Q
m,b
¬k,g and Q
m,c
¬k,g, where ¬ denotes the logical NOT.
2. All participants including the TP apply H to their Qm,ik,g qubits.
3. All participants including the TP measure their Qm,ik,g qubits in the computational basis and send the
respective measurement outcomes zm,ik,g to the TP via the classical authenticated channel.
4. For each message bit 1 ≤ m ≤ M , the TP calculates Dmk,g = ⊕n+1i=1 zm,ik,g ,∀(k, g). The mth message bit
of all participants are equal if Dmk,g = 0,∀g when k is fixed to either 0 or 1. The TP announces whether
the secrets are equal or not.
The correctness of this protocol can be deduced from the correctness of Protocol 3.
4. Security Analysis
The security of quantum private comparison protocols is hard to prove due to the participant’s and the
TP’s attacks. Previously, these protocols were vulnerable to participants’ attacks. However, the secrecy of
protocol increases due to the induction of anonymity and traceless properties. For security, we analyze the
quantum communication between the participants and the TP.
• Outside attacks : A designated player (e.g., Alice) shared the GHZ states via the quantum channel
with the parties and TP. After receiving the GHZ states, one party randomly selects GHZ state for
security check and also announces a random bit h. The value of h determines that all parties and
TP should perform Hadamard transformation or not. This process not only detects the adversaries
but also inquires about Alice’s honesty, whether she prepared the GHZ states correctly. After the
selection of GHZ state and value of h, Alice measures her particle in the computational basis and
announces the results. Then, each party and the TP measure their qubits and announce the result
to check the security of the communication. The attacker does not know in advance the value of h
and the GHZ state chosen by the random party. This process will prevent well-known attacks such as
intercept-resend attacks, entangled-resend attacks, and correlation elicitation attacks. The detection
of the adversary is Pd = 1− 2−S , where S is the security parameter.
• Participants attacks : The TP anonymously notifies the competing participants. To get the secret
information, the participants have to identify first the competing parties. To reveal the identity of
competitors is impossible for a single participant. After the encoding, the only communication between
participants and the TP is via the classical authenticated channel. This information does not reveal any
information to the participants. This communication only helps the TP to compute the comparison
results. Therefore, cheating and collusion attacks are not possible for the proposed protocol. The
private information is still not available for the adversaries if the n − 1 parties collude against the
one. The only option left for malicious parties is to adopt Eve’s strategies to steal private information.
These strategies are known as outside attacks. As discussed earlier, the protocol is secure against these
attacks.
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• TP’s attacks : Malicious TPs can also threaten the security of the private comparison protocols. The
TP can attack to gain useful information using her resources. Our procedure has a unique traceless
property to tackle the TP’s attacks. Firstly, with the assumption that semi-honest TP is not allowed
to collude with the participants. To prove the security, assume that competing parties (e.g., Alice and
Bob) have secrets of 0 and 1, respectively. After applying the unitaries, the GHZ state has a phase,
which means that the secrets are not equal. The TP computes the phase of the GHZ state with her
and each participant’s measurement outcomes. The TP cannot identify the party which introduced
the phase. So this protocol is secure against the TP’s attack as well.
5. Conclusion
Anonymity can be a useful but challenging requirement of any communication network. In this work, we
proposed the QAN protocol which can be implemented in quantum networks where anonymity is required
(e.g., accessing the quantum internet without revealing the identity). QAN provides both sender and receiver
anonymity. However, this protocol can be easily modified to provide receiver anonymity only. We used this
protocol as an application and introduced the anonymity in the MQPC. Firstly, TP notifies the participants
via the QAN protocols. Then, the MQPC protocol is executed to anonymously and securely perform the
comparison of secrets of different remote parties. Our framework allows two or more parties to compare
their secrets with the help of the remaining parties and a semi-honest TP. Security analysis shows that this
protocol is robust against malicious participants and the TP.
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